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Abstract
Youth-led protest actions and protests with young people as 
key protagonists have increased and become more diverse. 
This article constitutes a detailed case study of evolutions in 
policing and the legislative framework pertaining to protests 
and young protesters in Britain, drawing on political sociol-
ogy, political science, criminology and youth studies. The 
article first outlines the main protest actions involving young 
people in twenty-first century Britain. Next, it documents de-
velopments in policing tools and methods. It then explains 
changes to the legislative framework. I argue that through 
military-style policing tools and methods, combined with au-
thoritarian laws, successive British governments have de-
veloped coercive policing, the monitoring of protesters and 
the criminalisation of dissent. This runs counter to official 
discourse claiming there has been a return to policing by 
consent with greater attention to human rights and dialogue 
following criticisms from various official bodies. Thus, in re-
ality, an ostensibly liberal democratic state is wielding ex-
cessive force and coercion, as part of a securitisation pro-
cess, in a bid to regulate and repress young citizens’ protest 
actions construed as a disruptive threat to the political sta-
tus quo. In this way, young citizens are being deprived of 
their democratic and human right to peaceful protest with 
important implications for Britain and elsewhere.
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Resumen
Las acciones de protesta organizadas por los jóvenes, y en 
las que estos son protagonistas clave, son cada vez más 
numerosas y diversas. Este artículo constituye un estudio de 
caso detallado de la evolución de los métodos y los medios 
utilizados por la policía, y del marco legislativo relativo a es-
tas protestas y a los jóvenes manifestantes en Gran Bretaña, 
basado en la sociología política, las ciencias políticas, la crimi-
nología y los estudios sobre la juventud. En primer lugar, el 
artículo describe las principales acciones de protesta en las 
que participaron los jóvenes de la Gran Bretaña del siglo XXI. 
A continuación, documenta la evolución de los instrumentos y 
métodos policiales. A continuación se explican los cambios en 
el marco legislativo. En este artículo afirmo que, a través de 
herramientas y métodos policiales de tipo militar, combinados 
con leyes autoritarias, los sucesivos gobiernos británicos han 
desarrollado una policía coercitiva, la vigilancia de los mani-
festantes y la criminalización de la disidencia. Esto va en con-
tra del discurso oficial que afirma que ha habido un retorno a 
la actividad policial por consentimiento con mayor respeto de 
los derechos humanos y al diálogo tras las críticas de varios 
organismos oficiales. Así, en realidad, un Estado democrático 
ostensiblemente liberal está ejerciendo una fuerza y una co-
erción excesivas, como parte de un proceso de securización, 
en un intento de regular y reprimir las acciones de protesta 
de los jóvenes ciudadanos, interpretadas como una amenaza 
perturbadora para el statu quo político. De este modo, se está 
privando a los jóvenes ciudadanos de su derecho democráti-
co y humano a protestar pacíficamente, con importantes im-
plicaciones para Gran Bretaña y otros países.
Palabras Clave
Gran Bretaña; Juventud; Policía; Protesta; Represión.
Received: 18/12/2018. Accepted: 24/07/2019
Published online: 29/11/2019
RIS  [online] 2019, 77 (4), e139. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2019.77.4.19.002
2 . SARAH PICKARD
Introduction
Young people in Britain have been particularly af-
fected by neoliberalism, the fallout of the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis and the resulting austerity 
measures introduced by the right-wing Conserva-
tive Party. Significant cuts to governmental spend-
ing have had a substantial impact on many aspects 
of young people’s lives, including youth services, 
secondary education, further and higher education, 
indebtedness, employment, housing, mental health 
services and, more widely, public services. This is 
the first generation of young people who can expect 
their living standards and quality of life to be worse 
than those of their parents through exposure to po-
litical, constitutional and environmental crises that 
are resulting in the promises and expectations for a 
better future not being fulfilled (Pickard and Bessant 
2017). Furthermore, the probable withdrawal of Brit-
ain from the European Union – ‘Brexit’ – will have a 
disproportionally detrimental effect on young people 
compared to older citizens (Henn and Sloam 2018). 
Young citizens in Britain are not alone in bearing 
the brunt of austerity, precarity, social injustices 
and environmental degradation; they form part of a 
global phenomenon: a new young precarious gen-
eration (Bessant, Farthing and Watts 2017), whose 
life chances and hopes tend to be sidelined by poli-
ticians. At the same time, a growing proportion of 
young people are entering post-secondary educa-
tion and have greater access to digital technolo-
gies within an increasingly globalised world, which 
together afford them various types of agency to con-
test perceived injustices. 
Young citizens as school pupils, students and 
(potential) workers have been active participants 
in protest actions in Britain about various issues. 
Some protests have been centred on the notion of 
social justice, based on opposition to neoliberal-
ism and austerity, in relation to hikes in university 
tuition fees, cuts to public services, corporate tax 
avoidance, social inequalities, economic injustices, 
as well as US President Donald Trump’s visits to 
London and Brexit. The other prominent focus of 
protest actions has been environmental issues, no-
tably fracking (shale extraction) and airport expan-
sions. Moreover, environmental awareness and 
youth-led activism focusing on global warming and 
political inertia on the issue was bolstered at the 
end of 2018 and early 2019 by the ongoing pro-
test actions of Swedish school pupil Greta Thun-
berg and the environmentalist network Extinction 
Rebellion among others. In the UK and around the 
world, young people are calling on politicians and 
businesses to act.
Protests in Britain about youth-specific and other 
issues – of a much wider scope – represent an in-
crease in dissent initiated and supported by young 
people in particular (Datablog 2011, Pickard 2019a). 
They are part of an early twenty-first century global 
wave of protest (Barker 2008), resulting in a series 
of youth-led protests around the world (della Porta 
2014, 2015; Grasso 2017). This cycle of dissent 
(Tarrow 1989) is characterised by a circulation of 
concerns, protest strategies, structures and actions 
(Pickard and Bessant 2018). Significantly, the reper-
toire of protest action is expanding, as witnessed by 
a growing number of creative and disruptive forms 
of dissent that operate beyond hierarchical protest 
structures and traditional street demonstrations.
In Britain, online and offline dissent has taken di-
verse forms, from e-petitions and non-violent direct 
action (NVDA) to civil disobedience and criminal 
damage. In spite of the overwhelmingly peaceful, 
democratic and legal nature of the vast majority of 
the protests and the institutional political discourse 
on the importance of respecting human rights and 
‘policing by consent,’ young dissenters in Britain have 
encountered increasing levels of military-style polic-
ing tools and methods, combined with an expanding 
authoritarian legislative framework emanating from 
successive governments. 
Important changes to policing have been centred 
on its militarisation through the acquisition of mili-
tary weapons (Tasers, CS gas, water cannon), the 
containment (kettling) of protesters for extended pe-
riods, the collection and storage of audio-visual ma-
terial and DNA information on searchable databases 
and the generalised monitoring of protesters, mass 
arrests and pre-emptive detentions, as well as po-
lice warnings about the potential dangers for young 
people getting involved in protesting. Changes to 
laws have involved the introduction of extensive leg-
islation pertaining to the regulation of protest and 
the adaptation of existing statutes, including anti-ter-
rorism laws leading to the criminalisation of dissent 
(Pickard 2018a, 2018b).
In twenty-first century Britain, these changes to 
policing tools and methods, combined with chang-
es to legislation, have resulted in a shift away from 
‘policing by consent’ and the use of ‘reasonable 
force,’ towards ‘policing by coercion’ and the use 
‘excessive force.’ In other words, there has been 
both a move away from policing involving legitimacy, 
trust, compliance and common consent, and a move 
towards more policing involving force, power, fear 
and breaches of trust. This goes against the British 
tradition of policing by consent that dates back to 
the ‘General Instructions’ issued to all new police 
officers from 1829 onwards, known as the ‘Peelian 
Principles’ after Robert Peel who introduced them 
upon the establishment of the London Metropoli-
tan Police. These are based on nine ‘policing prin-
ciples’ and three core ideas, whose spirit can be 
best summed up by their definition of the role of the 
police as that of preventing crime and not catching 
criminals, and highlighting that the key to preventing 
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crime is to earn public support and trust by respect-
ing community principles (see LEAP 2019; Home 
Office 2012), as opposed to wielding the power of 
the State.1 For Reith (1956: 14), such a philosophy 
of policing is “unique in history and throughout the 
world because it derived not from fear but almost 
exclusively from public co-operation with the police, 
induced by them designedly by behaviour which se-
cures and maintains for them the approval, respect 
and affection of the public.” 
This article constitutes a case study of develop-
ments in policing and legislation in early twenty-first 
century Britain pertaining to protest actions that 
have largely been youth-led and youth-supported. 
It sets current policing methods and the legislative 
framework within historical and political contexts. 
Thus, this article aims to provide detailed and up-
to-date information on the shift towards the regula-
tion of young people’s dissent, set against the back-
ground of the side-lining of young citizens’ voices 
and political participation more widely. I proffer that 
despite changes carried out to policing following 
recommendations made by Her Majesty’s Police In-
spectorate (2009a, 2009b), the United Nations Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peace-
ful Assembly and of Association (UN 2013, 2017) 
and the Independent Police Complaints Commis-
sion (IPCC) (2015), policing methods and tools are 
increasingly coercive and involve excessive force 
that is sanctioned and facilitated by the State via 
the deliberately repressive legislative framework 
aimed at regulating and repressing young people’s 
protest actions. 
Indeed, successive governments in Britain have 
used ‘exceptional’ measures to regulate protests and 
they justify these measures in the name of maintain-
ing or establishing public safety, public order and 
security, as part of a process of securisation. I ar-
gue this is carried out by increasingly authoritarian 
governments in a bid to stifle and repress youthful 
dissent and quieten young people’s voices. This is 
because, on the one hand, young people’s views are 
often derided and dismissed, and on the other hand, 
their dissent is considered illegitimate and a disrup-
tive threat to the political status quo. These repre-
sentations are often upheld by the mainstream media 
that emphasises the negative labelling of young peo-
ple in general, and especially young people’s political 
participation, regardless of its form. 
The article first outlines the main youth-led pro-
test actions of young people in twenty-first century 
Britain. Next, it documents developments in State 
mechanisms to repress dissent via the militarisation 
of policing tools and methods. This is followed by a 
synopsis of the legislative framework regarding pro-
tests and repressive changes. The conclusion points 
to some concerns regarding evolutions in the policing 
and governance of young people’s protest actions.
Young people’s political partici-
pation and public order
The term ‘Millennial’ is being used increasingly 
in a pejorative way to label contemporary young 
people and make vast generalisations about them 
(for discussion, see Pickard 2019a). Numerous 
negative characteristics and labels are attributed 
to young citizens (Pickard 2014a), including in re-
lation to their political participation. Through ‘crisis 
narratives’ (O’Toole 2016) in the mainstream media 
and certain sections of academia, young people are 
often portrayed as a threat to democracy, as well 
as to social and public order due to their electoral 
behaviour and their protest actions.
First, young people are often portrayed as be-
ing politically apathetic or apolitical (for a summary, 
see Stoker 2006; Hay 2007). This label stems from 
the fact that 18 to 24-year-olds tend to have lower 
turnout rates in elections than older generations. In 
Britain, the electoral participation rate of this age 
bracket fell symbolically below 50 per cent in the 
2001 General Election and dropped even lower in 
the 2005 General Election. With less than half of 
young people voting to elect Members of Parlia-
ment (MPs) sitting in the House of Commons, there 
was a perceived democratic deficit (Pickard 2005). 
In this way, young people are portrayed as a threat 
to the future of democracy and social order. It is 
also said to be the cause of the delegitimisation of 
elected political institutions that is set to increase 
through generational replacement, as successive 
generations never get into the habit of voting. Yet 
political parties and politicians tend to ignore young 
people during election campaigns – ‘the youth vote’ 
– in favour of the ‘grey vote’ because older mem-
bers of the electorate have higher electoral par-
ticipation rates and they are more numerous in an 
ageing population. Being sidelined or overlooked 
by politicians during election campaigns and ad-
versely affected by neoliberalism and austerity 
measures leads many young people to feel alien-
ated from formal politics, while still being interested 
in political issues as “engaged sceptics” (Henn and 
Foard 2012), bringing about a further withdrawal 
from electoral participation. Generational labels re-
sult in all young people being portrayed as a threat 
to social order and deviant; they are all ‘tarred with 
the same brush’ and are reported to be the oppo-
site of dutiful citizens and “good citizens” (Dalton 
2015) who vote and participate in maintaining the 
political institutional status quo. This is part of the 
ongoing representation of ‘youth as a problem’ and 
‘youth as threat for the future’ narrative that does 
not call into question why so many young people 
abstain, and fails to acknowledge the crucial re-
sponsibility of politicians in dissuading young peo-
ple from voting and bringing about dissent that is 
then criminalised. 
RIS  [online] 2019, 77 (4), e139. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2019.77.4.19.002
4 . SARAH PICKARD
Next, for a growing number of young people, their 
political participation is expressed through ways 
that function outside electoral politics. It is argued 
that the decline in electoral participation among 
young people has created “a political space for citi-
zen involvement in a range of other mechanisms” 
(Joyce 2016: 1), including protest activities. Increas-
ingly distrustful of politicians but politically engaged, 
young people are regenerating political participation 
(Pickard and Bessant 2017) via “everyday” politics 
(Bang 2005), lifestyle politics (Bennett 1998, Gid-
dens 1991), “subpolitics” (Beck 1999) and “person-
alised politics” (Lichterman 1996), as “standby citi-
zens” (Amnå and Ekman 2014). This is what I call 
“Do-It-Ourselves (DIO)” politics (Pickard 2019a), i.e. 
individual and collective personalised political par-
ticipation usually associated with post-materialist 
values (Inglehart 1990) but also materialist con-
cerns due to precarity. It is often mediated via digital 
technologies and horizontal networks outside elect-
ed political institutions. As these alternative forms of 
political participation bypass electoral politics, once 
again young people are viewed by certain commen-
tators (journalists, politicians and policing authori-
ties) as a threat to democracy, as well as to public 
and social order because they do not maintain or 
reinforce the political status quo. This is especially 
the case in relation to protest actions that are in-
creasingly being expressed through various forms 
of DIO politics on a global scale, notably by young 
citizens within horizontal networks striving for inter-
nal democracy. Indeed, there have been numerous 
protests in Britain in the twenty-first century that 
have been youth-led and/or supported primarily by 
young people. 
Youth-led and youth-supported protest increased 
in Britain when Tony Blair was Prime Minister (1997-
2007). Three important protest campaigns took 
place. First, the Stop the War Coalition (StWC) 
march against the military invasion of Iraq in 2003 
was the biggest demonstration ever to occur in Lon-
don to date, bringing together one million protesters 
(Bloom 2012). Second, an anti-G20 Summit protest 
centred on concerns about the finance and banking 
sectors, economic policies and climate change (Mon-
biot 2009) happened in London in April 2009. Third, 
the 2009 annual Camp for Climate Action (Climate 
Camp) against industries and governmental policies 
that damage the environment was set up in the capi-
tal. These three protests about peace, social justice 
and the environment involved many young people; 
they were not about youth policy or specific youth 
matters, which underlines that young people are not 
uniquely concerned with youth-centred issues.
After ten years of Labour Governments, the Con-
servative Party – Liberal Democrat coalition govern-
ment entered office in May 2010 led by Prime Minis-
ter, David Cameron. It brought about an acceleration 
in young people’s protest activism. The Chancellor of 
the Exchequer rapidly started to introduce austerity 
measures, including substantial cuts to public funding 
of higher education, plans to treble annual university 
tuition fees and the intention to scrap the Educational 
Maintenance Allowance (a grant for 16 to 19-year-old 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds in further 
education). These three measures would particularly 
affect most young people in school, in higher educa-
tion and in work (bar those from the most privileged 
backgrounds), reflecting the often dismissive attitude 
among certain politicians regarding young people’s 
lives and futures. 
A series of protest days of action were organ-
ised centred on marches around the country at the 
time when the policy changes were being debated 
in Parliament (for details and discussion, see Pick-
ard 2014b, 2014c; Olcese and Saunders 2014). The 
first and largest day of action took place on 10 No-
vember 2010, when approximately 50,000 protest-
ers marched in the capital and thousands of others 
around the country. Dozens of university buildings 
were occupied for weeks, acting as important “or-
ganizing centres for the movement” (Casserly 2011: 
72). These student protests formed part of a global 
cycle of student protests (Brooks 2016; Cini 2018; 
Bessant et al 2020).
Numerous horizontal activist networks and pro-
test groups in favour of direct action participated in 
the organisation of further protest actions. These in-
cluded the Education Activist Network (EAN) and the 
National Campaign Against Fees and Cuts (NCAFC), 
the Campaign for Free Education, the Stop the Fees 
Campaign and the Coalition of Resistance. It is also 
of note that UK Uncut was launched in October 2010 
as a protest network primarily against corporate tax 
avoidance and governmental cuts to public spend-
ing, and in October 2011, Occupy London started to 
camp outside Saint Paul’s Cathedral next to the Lon-
don Stock Exchange calling for “real global democ-
racy” (Gitlin 2012). 
Furthermore, over two years after the June 2016 
referendum on Britain leaving the European Union, 
there was a significant demonstration in London and 
other smaller events around the country, in favour of 
holding a ‘People’s Vote’ to have a ‘final say’ on the 
‘Brexit’ deal. Nearly three quarters of a million people 
marched in London on 20 October 2018, according 
to estimates. The demonstration was started by the 
Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, who commented that 
young people’s “future is on the line”; standing with 
him at the head of the demonstration were “some 
1,000 young activists [who] led the so-called ‘March 
for the Future’ from Park Lane towards a rally in Parlia-
ment Square” (Agerholm and Baynes 2018). Another 
very sizeable demonstration, involving an estimated 
one million people, took place on 23 March 2019 de-
manding a further referendum on whether the United 
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Kingdom should leave the European Union, bearing 
in mind young people voted massively to ‘remain’ in 
the 2016 referendum.2
Finally, there have been ongoing environmental 
campaigns, such as Plane Stupid founded in 2005 
contesting airport expansions and continuing anti-
fracking campaigns against shale gas extraction 
around the country (see Pickard 2019b). Most signifi-
cantly, towards the end of 2018, significant numbers 
of young people, especially school pupils became 
actively involved in the global wave of protest against 
climate change and institutional inertia on environ-
mental degradation, spurred by the Swedish school 
pupil Greta Thunberg (#climatestrike, #FridaysFor-
Future) and then the environmental activist network 
Extinction Rebellion with its youth section XRyouth. 
The vast majority of the protests that have oc-
curred in the twenty-first century involving various 
forms of direct action have been peaceful. However, 
young protesters expressing their democratic right to 
peaceful protest have been met with an increasingly 
military-style of protest policing, as the next section 
explores. 
The militarisation of protest po-
licing: tools and methods
Despite recommendations from official bodies, as 
well as political and policing rhetoric, there has been 
a shift away from the tradition of ‘policing by consent,’ 
‘negotiated management’ and ‘reasonable force’ in 
various protest situations, and a shift towards polic-
ing by coercion and the use of excessive force that 
is wielded on young people as organisers and par-
ticipants in the main protest actions in Britain during 
the twenty-first century. This section shows that there 
have been important developments in policing tactics 
and policing tools made available for “protest polic-
ing” (della Porta and Reiter 1998; della Porta 2013). 
Policing responses to the increase in youth-protest 
actions in Britain indicate an escalation of oppressive 
and militaristic forms of policing. These are threefold: 
(1) tools and methods available to police officers, (2) 
surveillance and monitoring of protesters combined 
with the storage of information on searchable data 
bases, (3) criminal law practises, such as pre-emp-
tive arrests, mass arrests, extended detention and 
conditional bail. 
Most of these policing methods were used at the 
anti-G20 Summit protest in London, in April 2009. 
The peaceful Climate Camp protest was cordoned 
off by police officers in riot gear and evacuated by 
force with the use of police shields. Police Officers’ 
notebooks used as evidence in court proceedings at-
test that they deliberately punched and hit protesters 
in the face, and struck them with the flat and angled 
sides of riot shields (Townsend 2009).
Following the policing tactics deployed in the 2009 
anti-G20 Summit, many official reports were writ-
ten, including two by the statutory body that inspects 
police forces: Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Con-
stabulary (HMIC 2009a, 2009b).3 Immediate recom-
mendations were stipulated, including that the police 
should: (1) facilitate peaceful protest, (2) improve 
dialogue with protest groups where possible, (3) im-
prove communication with the public, (4) moderate 
the impact of containment when used, (5) improve 
training to equip officers to deal with the full spectrum 
of protest activity; and (6) wear clear identification at 
all times. The HMIC report also recommended that 
national guidance on the policing of protest needed 
overhauling by the Association of Chief Police Offi-
cers (ACPO). In the two reports, the HMIC made it 
clear that the policing of public order events must be 
lawful, consensual and legal, not provocative and ag-
gressive (Bloom 2012: 3). 
However, these official recommendations have 
not always been followed by individual ‘rogue’ police 
officers and police forces in general, especially the 
London Metropolitan Police Service. On the contrary, 
the militarisation of policing tools and methods are 
clear proof of a more confrontational and coercive 
approach to the policing of protests.
The militarisation of policing tools and methods
The procurement and use of military-style weap-
ons by the police in the context of public protest in 
Britain has increased in recent years. Following pi-
lot schemes around the country, a majority of po-
lice forces started using Tasers in 2009, and they 
are authorised to do so in protest situations. Tasers 
are ‘conducted electrical weapons’ or ‘electro-shock 
weapons’ that fire electrically charged probes, in or-
der to incapacitate the ‘target.’ A more powerful ver-
sion ‘Taser X2’ was authorised for use by police in 
England and Wales by the Conservative Home Sec-
retary, in March 2017. CS spray (also called tear gas 
or pepper spray) is also available for police use in 
public order contexts.
Other weapons, hitherto not available in mainland 
Britain, have been procured by police forces for pub-
lic order purposes.4 The Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) stated in a briefing paper in January 
2014 that they expected water cannon to be required 
because “ongoing and potential future austerity mea-
sures are likely to lead to continued protest” (ACPO 
2014). Afterwards, a spokesperson from the Home 
Office commented: “We are keen to ensure forces 
have the tools and powers they need to maintain or-
der on our streets. We are currently providing advice 
to the police on the authorisation process as they 
build the case for the use of water cannon” (Travis 
2014). Boris Johnson, Conservative Mayor of London 
at the time, approved the purchase of three second-
hand water cannon from Germany for public order 
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ment is indiscriminate (bystanders and peaceful 
protesters are contained) and therefore it has been 
described as ‘collective punishment’ in breach of the 
Geneva Conventions, 1949 and de facto open air 
imprisonment without a trial in violation of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (Article 5): the 
right to liberty and security. Containment can also 
be considered inhumane due to access to food, 
water and toilets being withheld for several hours. 
Containment can also be frightening and danger-
ous, for example, when it lasted several hours and 
into the night, as it did on London Bridge during the 
2010 student protests (Pickard 2014b). For all these 
reasons, containment is not a consensual form of 
policing and it inevitably creates unnecessary fear 
and hostility towards the police.
Moreover, release from a kettle is made contingent 
on the provision to police officers of information with 
intimidating threats of fines and arrest for noncom-
pliance, even though such requests are not officially 
permitted (Swain 2013). In this way, containment is 
also used in order to monitor and harvest personal 
information, such as biometric data (for example, 
names, addresses, and fingerprints via mobile digital 
fingerprinting devices), which is part of the surveil-
lance and monitoring techniques used by the police, 
whereby protesters are viewed as ‘suspect’ and a 
threat to security (Coleman and McCahill 2010). 
This constitutes coercive policing, in a country where 
identity cards do not exist.5
Police surveillance and monitoring techniques
Protesters in Britain (and elsewhere) are monitored 
online and offline through diverse means that have 
been facilitated by digital technologies. The overt and 
covert surveillance of protesters during marches is 
undertaken by different types of police officers and 
especially within Forward Intelligence Teams (FIT) 
and Evidence Gathering Teams (EGT). 
During marches and rallies, Forward Intelligence 
Teams (FIT) observe and track participants, not-
ing appearance, behaviour, communication, move-
ment and associations. According to Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC 2009a: 127), 
“one of the tactics employed by FITs is to seek out 
persons likely to engage in disorder and follow them 
to monitor their actions. The purpose of this is to 
deprive the person of the ability to engage in disor-
der, due to the proximity of police officers.” These 
methods have been condemned for being oppres-
sive and involving harassment of peaceful protest-
ers (UN 2013, 2017). 
Evidence Gathering Teams (EGT) overtly record, 
photograph and film protest participants, for the “pre-
vention and detection of crime the maintenance of 
public order and the gathering of intelligence in sup-
port of such policing aims” (Derbyshire Constabulary 
management in the capital (PCC 2014). When chal-
lenged about the potential dangers, the politician re-
plied, “they are not military weapons. They would not 
be much use in warfare and I’m not aware of any 
regiment that deploys water cannon. […] The police 
already have access to much more violent means of 
crowd control. If you look at a baton round, it’s no 
joke if you get that in the eye” (Barrett 2014). Indeed, 
further militarisation of policing has been the authori-
sation of the deployment of attenuating energy pro-
jectiles (AEP) (sometimes called rubber bullets, plas-
tic bullets or baton rounds) by police firearms teams 
in London. Crucially, permissions to use them were 
issued just prior to planned student demonstrations 
against the increase of annual university tuition fees 
held in November 2011 (Wilson 2011; Milmo 2012). 
Neither water cannon nor AEP have been used by 
the police on protesters in mainland Britain. But their 
procurement and authorisation by elected politicians 
are marked illustrations (in a country where police are 
traditionally unarmed) of the increasing militarisation 
of policing methods and attempts to repress youth-
led protest, the main form of dissent in recent years. 
Change in protest policing has also involved at-
tempting to overtly deter young people from exercis-
ing their democratic right to peaceful protest via po-
lice warnings; for example, Commander Broadhurst 
from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) issued 
the following statement on 29 November 2010, prior 
to a student-led protest, on the dangers of protesting 
for young people:
Schoolchildren have as much right as anyone else to 
protest, but young people are more vulnerable and 
likely to be injured if violence breaks out. We would 
ask parents to talk to their children and make sure 
they’re aware of the potential dangers, as there is 
only so much police officers can do once they are in 
a crowd of thousands (BBC 2010).
Beyond the expansion of the repertoire of weap-
ons made available to the police for use in protest 
situations and attempts to produce a “chilling effect,” 
there has also been the increasing recourse to the 
police tactic called ‘containment’ or ‘kettling.’ Police 
officers contain a group of people (protesters, by-
standers, observers) in a designated area (a public 
square, a road or a bridge), i.e. a kettle, by surround-
ing them with a police cordon or by blocking them 
into a confined area. It allows the police to restrict the 
movement of those inside, in order to control their 
movement ostensibly for the purpose of reducing po-
tential disorder. 
Containment is problematic for several ideological 
and humanitarian rights reasons, especially when 
young people are involved, as has been the case 
in Britain. Those contained are detained and de-
prived of their freedom of movement, sometimes for 
hours, without having committed or being suspected 
of having committed any criminal activity. Contain-
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2018). This may involve identifying, spotting, follow-
ing and monitoring particular people. Substantial 
concerns were also expressed about EGTs by Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary: “police use 
of overt photography raises significant human rights 
issues, notably the question of whether police action 
is compatible with the right to private life protected by 
ECHR” (HMIC 2009a: 122). 
Despite demands for more consensual policing, 
FIT and EGT continue to operate during peaceful 
demonstrations in an often intimidating way. They are 
clearly employing methods that cannot be construed 
as consensual.6 Peaceful protesters and bystanders 
not engaged in any illegal or offensive behaviour are 
also recorded and filmed. Moreover, the information 
and images are stored on searchable data bases 
(see below). 
In a bid to foster better – more consensual – re-
lations between the police and protesters during 
marches, Police Liaison Officers (PLO) were intro-
duced in 2012 as uniformed police officers wearing 
light blue bibs who mingle with protesters during 
demonstrations and marches. Their official role is to 
promote dialogue and communication (see Wadding-
ton 2012; Stott et al 2013), before, during and after 
protest actions. This is part of an effort to encour-
age consensual policing and to gain trust following 
recommendations made by the HMIC in 2009 (see 
above). The role of PLOs regarding information and 
intelligence gathering is unclear, according to the 
College of Policing (2015: 17-19) and the UN spe-
cial rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association (UN 2017), among oth-
ers. Activists and activist networks have argued that 
beyond attempting to foster dialogue and consensual 
policing, PLOs carry out intelligence gathering, in-
timidation and harassment of political activists (see 
Netpol 2014, DTRTP 2018), making their actions far 
from consensual (Jackson et al 2019). 
Other surveillance tactics have included police 
operatives with fake identities infiltrating political 
groups, notably, environmental activist networks, in 
order to carry out covert surveillance of law-abiding 
protesters, disrupt protests and act as agent provo-
cateurs by initiating, organising and encouraging civil 
disobedience. There have been mediatised cases of 
undercover police officers fathering children with fe-
male activists unaware of their true identity (Evans 
and Lewis 2013). 
Thus, in the early twenty-first century, police of-
ficers in Britain have acquired various military-style 
tools and methods employed especially on young 
protesters. The far from consensual militarisation 
of protest policing has been enabled by significant 
changes to the British legislative framework that is 
repressing democratic protest carried out by young 
people in particular, as examined in the next section. 
The legislative criminalisation 
of protest
The Thatcher years (1979-1990) was a period of 
significant social and political unrest in Britain. This 
led the Conservative Government to enact the Pub-
lic Order Act 1986. The statute created many public 
order offences and imposed various conditions on 
the organisers of public “processions” (i.e. moving 
protests or marches) and assemblies. It allows the 
police authorities to set various conditions, such as 
to change the location of a march, control its dura-
tion, limit the number of people attending, and stop a 
sit-down protest if it blocks a road or public walkway. 
The police also have the power to forbid a march by 
applying a banning order, or the dispersal of a public 
assembly if a senior police officer “has reasonable 
belief” that it may result in serious public disorder, 
serious damage or serious disruption to the life of 
the community. Furthermore, the statute permits the 
police to prohibit marches and impose specific con-
ditions on organisers during a period of negotiation 
aimed at finding a consensus. However, for Wad-
dington (1998: 120), “once negotiation begins, the 
aim of the police is to ‘win over’ the negotiator so 
that the demonstration is conducted as far as pos-
sible in accordance with police wishes.” For example, 
through ‘negotiation,’ the National Union of Students 
(NUS) demonstration “Educate, Employ, Empower” 
on 21 November 2012 bypassed the Houses of Par-
liament and ended in Kennington Park, rather than 
the symbolic Parliament Square, much to the frus-
tration of many protesters. According to Waddington 
(1998: 122), “attempts subtly to extend maximum 
control over protest do not cease once prior arrange-
ments have been made.” The Public Order Act has 
been “bitterly attacked as a draconian assault on civil 
liberties by many critics” (Reiner 1998: 46, see also 
Waddington 1994). The focus of criticisms is that the 
requirements and restrictions contained in the legis-
lation can be interpreted as an affront to civil liberties 
and an infringement of the 1950 European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR), notably, “Freedom of 
expression” (Article 11) and “Freedom of assembly 
and association” (Article 11). 
The Public Order Act 1986 is thus the cornerstone 
of British legislation with regard to the control of pro-
tests. Since its enactment, new criminal justice laws 
have been passed, others have been amended, and 
existing laws drawn up ostensibly for other purposes 
have been applied to protests. This has been carried 
out by both Conservative and Labour governments in 
a bid to restrict and control protest actions. 
Further legislation regulating and restricting pro-
test was passed when Tony Blair was the centre-left 
‘New Labour’ Prime Minister (1997-2007). With the 
enactment of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the 
police obtained greater powers, whereas protesters 
saw more restrictions placed on them. The statute 
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introduced the fuzzy and subjective term ‘anti-social 
behaviour’ (ASB), which had an even fuzzier legal 
definition: “conduct which caused or was likely to 
cause alarm, harassment, or distress.” Drawn up ini-
tially to deal with anti-social behaviour in social hous-
ing, the legislation was soon used by the police in 
public protest situations. This led to anxiety that the 
police could further reduce freedom of expression 
and freedom of peaceful assembly (INCLO 2013). 
Later, the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing 
Act 2014 enacted by the Conservative Party – Liberal 
Democrat coalition government further strengthened 
the legislative framework by consolidating, expand-
ing and reinforcing law enforcement powers in pro-
test situations in public spaces. Part 4, Section 58 of 
the statute allowed local authorities to make a pre-
ventative ‘Public spaces protection order’ (PSPO) to 
curtail activities in a designated public space. Part 3, 
Sections 34 to 42 allowed the police to create ‘Dis-
persal Zones’ and gave the police the pre-emptive 
“Dispersal Power”, that “requires a person commit-
ting or likely to commit anti-social behaviour, crime 
or disorder to leave an area for up to 48 hours” for 
the purpose of “reducing the likelihood of alarm, ha-
rassment, or distress,” as stipulated in the Anti-Social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. It is signifi-
cant that dispersal powers can be applied prior to a 
protest, which entails removing the human rights of 
people who have not committed an offence. They 
are also applied ‘on the spot’ and have been used 
on lawful peaceful protest situations (Netpol 2015). 
Crucially, non-compliance and breach of a Dispersal 
Order constitutes a criminal offence, resulting in a 
fine and/or up to three months in prison (Home Of-
fice 2017). The statute has been criticised for being 
“a law to stop almost anyone from doing almost any-
thing” (Monbiot 2014) and thus leading to coercive 
rather than consensual policing.
A further piece of legislation pertaining to the 
regulation of protests that involves fuzzy terminol-
ogy is the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 
(SOCPA) 2005 (Part 3, Sections 110 and 111). It per-
mits the police to only need “reasonable grounds” to 
arrest someone. After an arrest, the Crown Prosecu-
tion Service decides whether the case merits being 
taken to court. The United Nations Special Rappor-
teur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly 
and of Association is highly critical of these mea-
sures: “the use of pre-emptive measures – verbal 
warnings and arrests – by the authorities against 
individuals suspected of being likely to commit of-
fences during protests is troubling” (UN 2013: 3). 
He continues: “I am also dismayed about very strict 
police bail conditions which have been imposed on 
protesters who have been arrested, to deter them 
from further exercising their rights. Such conditions 
may be challenged before a court, but the process is 
costly and can be a strain to some” (UN 2013: 3), es-
pecially to young people. Indeed, the police can use 
pre-charge bail with demanding conditions, which 
can prevent an individual from taking part in further 
protest for extended periods, even though he/she 
has not been prosecuted, leaving the individual in 
a ‘legal limbo,’ so that the police has time to gather 
additional evidence to be able to press charges. 
This puts into question the fundamental British con-
stitutional principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty.’ 
Moreover, pre-charge bail restrictions on someone 
not actually charged with any crime can include not 
associating with certain persons, not going to a par-
ticular area, not protesting and not leaving the coun-
try, thus infringing human rights, such a freedom of 
expression and movement, which once again goes 
against the principle of policing by consent.
A very small proportion of the young people who 
were arrested and subsequently put on bail after the 
2010 student protests were sentenced (for data see 
Rawlinson 2014). Critics suggest that there was in-
discriminate arrest, repressive arrest to hinder fur-
ther participation in protests and deterrent arrest 
(and sentencing) to discourage others. Moreover, 
the Serious Organised Police Crime Act (SOCPA) 
2005 (Sections 132-138) placed restrictions protest 
in Westminster around the Houses of Parliament. 
These sections were repealed by the Police Reform 
and Social Responsibility Act 2011, which created 
further limitations on peaceful protests in Parliament 
Square.
Another trend in British legislation has been that 
statutes drawn up initially to prevent terrorism have 
been used to thwart, curtail or end peaceful protests. 
Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 authorised po-
lice to ‘stop and search’ members of the public with-
out the need for reasonable suspicion that terrorism 
had occurred or was likely to take place, which is a 
clear example of the securitisation process. ‘Stop and 
search’ has been carried out in various protest situ-
ations. A peace protester and a journalist brought a 
case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
in 2010, which ruled the police powers of ‘stop and 
search’ in the context of peaceful protest to be un-
lawful, as the police lacked sufficient safeguards to 
protect basic civil liberties, i.e. the right to freedom 
of expression and the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly. Thus, indiscriminate ‘stop and search’ was 
deemed incompatible with the European Convention 
on Human Rights, and it also put into question the 
constitutional presumption of innocence. The then 
Home Secretary Theresa May was forced to repeal 
Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and introduce a 
new suspicion threshold.
In addition, there has been a conflation of peaceful 
protest with terrorism, in part due to a very fuzzy or 
loose or definition of ‘terrorism.’ The Occupy London 
movement that camped out in the capital in 2011-
2012 was designated as “domestic extremism” in a 
counter-terrorism document from the City of London 
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police (Quinn 2015). The National Council for Civil 
Liberties, usually just called Liberty (2018), is very 
critical of the governmental legislation:
Much recent counter-terrorism legislation is danger-
ously over-broad and has affected vast numbers of 
people, in particular peaceful protesters and ethnic 
minority groups, thereby undermining civil liberties 
and fundamental human rights. […].
Last, new statutory powers have been added 
through legislation that allows the monitoring of 
groups and individuals. The Data Retention and In-
vestigatory Powers Act 2014 authorised State intel-
ligence agencies, security services and law enforce-
ment authorities to access telephone and internet 
records held by providers. Considered by many MPs 
and civil rights groups an infringement of privacy, it 
was ruled unlawful by the High Court in 2015. First, 
it was amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Secu-
rity Act 2015, which enables “the Secretary of State 
to require communications service providers to re-
tain an additional category of communications data, 
namely data that will allow relevant authorities to link 
the unique attributes of a public Internet Protocol (IP) 
address to the person (or device) using it at any given 
time.” It was then replaced by the Investigatory Pow-
ers Act 2016 that allows certain surveillance powers 
and certain safeguards to them through covert moni-
toring in an obviously non-consensual way.
The extensive amount of information obtained 
through such means and other methods is held on 
various searchable police data bases, including the 
Police National Computer (PNC) and the Police Na-
tional Database (PND) to be replaced by the National 
Law Enforcement Data Programme (NLEDP) that will 
“introduce new and enhanced data sets into LEDS 
such as, Biometrics, Images from DVLA & Passports, 
ANPR and analytical tools” (Home Office 2018). 
Other databases comprise IDENT1 and the Crimint 
(criminal intelligence) database used by the London 
Metropolitan Police Service, as well as the National 
DNA Database (NDNAD), which is the biggest in the 
world in relation to the size of the population and 
the quantity of information held. At the start of 2019, 
there were 6.38 “subject sample profiles retained on 
NDNAD,” with samples of an estimated 5.49 million 
“individuals” classified according to gender, “ethnic 
appearance” and age, with 32.72% of people aged 
16-24 when their information was loaded onto the da-
tabase as of 2019 (Home Office 2019).7 Moreover, in-
formation on people with different statutes (convicted 
criminals and suspected criminals, but also political 
campaigners and protesters) is all held in the same 
data bases (Lewis and Vallée 2009). 
The legislative framework has thus been consid-
erably widened and adapted regarding protests in 
recent years, whereby “antiterrorist laws, restrictions 
on individual freedoms and individual rights have 
been presented as necessary in order to defend de-
mocracy” (della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006: 5), 
as part of a securitisation process that particularly af-
fects young people. 
Conclusions
This case study of Britain has noted that there is 
an increasing number of youth-led protests that form 
part of a global wave of dissent, which has been trig-
gered by political action and inaction of successive 
governments on issues particularly salient to young 
citizens. Young people, such as school pupils, stu-
dents and workers have been key protagonists in 
these protest actions. 
At the same time, there have been significant 
changes to policing and legislation pertaining to pro-
tests in Britain, which have brought about the milita-
risation of policing and tighter regulation of protests. 
First, policing has changed significantly as part of a 
militarisation process. This has involved adjustments 
to: (1) tools and methods available to police officers, 
(2) surveillance and monitoring of protesters com-
bined with the storage of information on searchable 
data bases, (3) criminal law practises, such as pre-
emptive arrests, mass arrests, detention and condi-
tional bail. Second, legislation has changed through 
additions, amendments and adaptations. Thus, there 
has been a marked growth in State repression of pro-
test characterised by a distinctly punitive turn (Gras-
so and Bessant 2017). 
Moreover, the British judicial system tends to 
uphold tougher policing strategies when they have 
been challenged in court. There have a been a se-
ries of judicial cases regarding the use of “unnec-
essary force,” “unjustified force,” “excessive force” 
and coercive policing associated with the militarisa-
tion of protest situations brought against individual 
police officers and the London Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS). These include cases regarding ket-
tling for extended periods, containment of minors, 
forced dispersal of peaceful protesters by police 
wearing helmets and dressed in riot gear, etc. The 
High Court and the Court of Appeal have rejected 
most claims and ruled in favour of the MPS (for 
example, CRAE 2011).8
The police have the difficult task of striking a bal-
ance between defending civil rights and liberties, 
whilst upholding security in a context of increasing 
dissent and cuts to police funding due to austerity. 
For Jackson et al (2012: 10), “policing by consent 
is based upon the idea that the police gain volun-
tary approval and cooperation from the public not 
through aggressive control of the population, but 
through fostering a close social connection between 
the police and public.” Policing by coercion using 
excessive force and repression that young protest-
ers in Britain have been experiencing is not a very 
constructive way to manage democratic youth-led 
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protests involving many young people. It impinges 
on trust in the police, the State and politics more 
widely. 
The populist mainstream media tend to use hy-
perbolic and negative headlines about young pro-
testers, often via pejorative generational labels, 
representing them as “unruly,” “threatening” and 
“anarchic,” or self-interested (such as “privileged” 
higher education students) or opportunistic (such 
as school pupils concerned about climate change 
skipping school), or naïve and ill-informed. These 
media representations serve to delegitimise young 
people’s political participation and project the im-
age that young people’s actions are a source of 
“moral panic” (Cohen 1972), as part of the “crises 
narratives” (O’Toole 2016) produced about young 
people’s political participation. Such hostile media 
representations of young protesters provide justi-
fications for politicians and police organisations to 
toughen protest policing (Wisler and Giugni 1999) 
and to introduce stricter legislative control of public 
protests and repress them, as well as to be seen 
doing so by the general public.
Thus, the loop is closed and the securitisation pro-
cess is established. Young people are derided and 
demonised and their political participation consid-
ered as the disruptive source of a moral panic; young 
people are affected by more restrictive policing prac-
tices and statutes regarding their constitutional right 
to freedom of expression and the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly. Together these developments 
have created a more authoritarian environment that 
is at odds with the traditional ‘policing by consent’ 
and human rights. They have also led to the creation 
of physical, electronic, legal and psychological bar-
riers to dissent that particularly affect young people.
Despite numerous warnings and recommenda-
tions made by the House of Commons and House 
of Lords Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR 
2009: 53), Her Majesty’s Police Inspectorate (2009a, 
2009b), the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and 
of Association (UN 2013), the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC) (2015), human 
rights lobbies and activist networks about protest 
policing and the legislative framework in Britain, 
these remain repressive. This stands out in forth-
right comments made by the UN Special Rappor-
teur in a follow up report:
84. There is no doubt that the United Kingdom 
takes its role as one of the global leaders in human 
rights seriously. Many people around the world look 
to the United Kingdom as a model for democracy 
and respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms. They notice when the country takes positive 
steps to strengthen its practice in that area. How-
ever, they notice even more when it moves in the 
opposite direction.
85. The Special Rapporteur appreciates that the 
Government has made efforts to address some of the 
recommendations he made three years ago. Howev-
er, he notes with concern that a series of separate 
measures by the Government, some implemented 
and others proposed, have negatively impacted the 
exercise of the rights to freedom of association and 
freedom of peaceful assembly and, in general, are 
resulting in the closing of space for civil society. In 
many instances, these moves have been subtle and 
gradual, but they are as unmistakable as they are 
alarming. He is concerned that, put together, these 
measures suggest that the Government has a nega-
tive view of civil society as a critical partner that can 
and should hold it accountable (UN 2017: 19).9
These developments are disquieting and have 
important implications regarding the governance of 
young people’s political participation, their human 
rights and democracy more widely. 
This article set out the situation in the United King-
dom and documented the changing landscape of the 
policing of dissent and the legislative framework. I 
underlined how in an ostensibly liberal democratic 
state, successive governments through increas-
ingly coercive policing and layers of legislation that 
repress protests have attempted to exert social and 
public order control. This is in order to dissuade and 
discourage protests, but also to gain greater powers 
to prevent them occurring and to stop them as part 
of a securitisation process. It is a way to stifle young 
people as key protagonists organising and participat-
ing in protest actions and to quash democratic youth-
ful disruptive dissent that challenges the political 
status quo. Such authoritarian governance through 
policing and legislation is not healthy for democracy 
and it brings about or reinforces a lack of trust in the 
police as agents of the State and impinges on young 
people’s electoral and non-electoral political partici-
pation going forward more widely. This comes at a 
time when there have been big cuts to police fund-
ing and there has been a growth in the number and 
intensity of protest actions led and followed by young 
people who are increasingly disillusioned with party 
politics and distrust elected politicians. This does not 
bode well for the future of democracy and the pos-
sibility of protesting by future generations of young 
people who are living in increasingly precarious cir-
cumstances and are environmentally concerned. 
We need more qualitative research on the impact of 
developments in protest policing and legislation on 
young people and their propensity to protest, as well 
as their attitudes towards elected politicians, policing 
and civil liberties. The implications are important in so 
far as the United Kingdom had a long standing tradi-
tion of policing by consent (rather than coercion) and 
respect for human rights.
Concerns for democracy and human rights are 
all the more pertinent as the country leaves the Eu-
ropean Union (‘Brexit’) and thus the Court of Justice 
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of the European Union (CJEU), amongst growing 
calls from pro-British sovereignty politicians for the 
European Convention on Human Rights enshrined 
in Britain’s Human Rights Act 1999 to be revoked 
from its legislative framework. Young voices should 
be heard and taken into account rather than be 
monitored, controlled, regulated, repressed and 
criminalised.
Notes
1. The first principles that clearly illustrate policing by con-
sent are as follows: (1) To prevent crime and disorder, 
as an alternative to their repression by military force 
and severity of legal punishment. (2) To recognise al-
ways that the power of the police to fulfil their functions 
and duties is dependent on public approval of their ex-
istence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to 
secure and maintain public respect. [...] (4) To recog-
nise always that the extent to which the co-operation of 
the public can be secured diminishes proportionately 
the necessity of the use of physical force and compul-
sion for achieving police objectives.
2. There have also been smaller demonstrations and ral-
lies organised by far-right networks and groups, for 
example, the English Defence League (EDL), once 
led by Tommy Robinson (real name Stephen Yaxley-
Lennon, born 1982), who is now at the origin of vari-
ous extreme-right wing protest actions often involving 
violent episodes and clashes with the police and anti-
fascist groups. However, they are relatively small-scale 
and involve only a small proportion of young people 
compared to the protests about austerity, social justice 
and the environment.
3. In 2017, the HMIC was renamed Her Majesty’s Inspec-
torate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services 
(HMICFRS). 
4. The UK consists of England, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. Mainland Britain constitutes only the 
island of England, Wales and Scotland. During the 
‘Troubles’ of the 1970s onwards, involving sectarian 
terrorism, British soldiers were deployed in Northern 
Ireland and they used various forms of military weap-
ons that have not been employed elsewhere in the UK.
5. Most police forces use fingerprint scanning, whereby 
fingerprints are taken with a hand-held fingerprint 
scanner using MobileID (mobile identification) technol-
ogy, which crosschecks in minutes via satellite with the 
tens of millions of fingerprints in the searchable finger 
and palm print national police database (NPD): Ident1. 
Police can take fingerprints with or without consent if 
they ‘reasonably suspect’ someone has committed a 
serious offense.
6. I have been photographed and filmed on various oc-
casions whilst acting as an independent observer of 
marches and protest actions. For photos taken of po-
lice officers involved, see Pickard, 2018b.
7. Ages on load, 10-15 years: 07.99%; 16-17 years: 
06.47%; 18-20 years: 12.92%; 21-24 years: 13.33%, 
25-34 years: 25.08%; 35-44 years: 18.51%; 45-54 
years: 10.23%; 55-64 years: 04.03%; 65+ years: 
01.42% (Home Office 2019).
8. Individual police officers have been held to account, 
for example when using CS spray at close range on 
peaceful UK Uncut activists (Taylor and Paige 2011). 
The then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, 
Bernard Hogan-Howe, was obliged to apologise for the 
“unnecessary and unlawful” “excessive force” causing 
protesters “intense pain, momentary loss of sight, and 
feelings of panic and fear,” and for the police prevent-
ing people from “exercising their fundamental right to 
protest” (Evans 2014).
9. The UN Special Rapporteur (UN 2017) restated do-
zens of recommendations on the “right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly,” which underline the lack of change 
since his earlier report. 
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